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Can unions substitute a procedural justice role for their traditional reliance on establishing a 
‘common rule’?  The decline of ‘bureaucratic’ models of employee management and the rise 
of performance pay and performance management conflicts with the common rule as 
management seek to tie rewards more closely to individual and organisational performance. 
CEP studies of performance pay in the British public services illustrate the potential for a 
procedural justice role to ensure that such pay systems are operated fairly, otherwise they risk 
demotivating staff.  Evidence is presented to show that employees regard unions as effective 
vehicles for procedural justice.  In this way, management can achieve better operation of their 
incentive schemes, and employees may experience less unfairness and poisoned work 
relations. 
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1.  New Work Systems and ‘Procedural Justice’ 
 
New management thinking on work organisation and pay brings it into direct conflict with 
long-established methods trade unions have used to defend their members’ interests and their 
ideas of fairness.  No doubt, this has contributed to the declining management interest in 
‘joint regulation’ with unions in recent decades, and not just in Britain and the US.  As 
employers have striven to make their organisations more responsive to more competitive and 
faster changing markets, they have sought to devolve decision-making in their organisations, 
and to rely more upon employees thinking for themselves and using their initiative.  To break 
away from bureaucratic p atterns of organisation, they have needed to adopt more 
performance-oriented reward systems so that they can reward initiative and flexible working, 
and reinforce the message about the need for ‘performance’ (Cappelli et al, 1997, Ch.  1). 
  Historically, the ‘common rule’ has been a key principle of trade union regulation of 
workers’ pay and conditions, and has given substance to notions of fairness (Webb S .  & 
Webb B, 1898).  One of its most important manifestations has been the ‘standard rate’, the 
idea that unions should seek to establish a minimum rate of pay for particular types of work: 
a minimum rate per unit of time, or per piece or job realised.  Today, in continental Europe 
and still in large parts of the British public services, there are sectoral agreements establishing 
such standard rates of pay, usually linking these to complex systems of job classification. 
  In the workplace too, the idea of a common rule fitted with traditional payment-by-
results (PBR) systems that applied common rates of pay  to particular jobs, or applied 
common rules for the number of pieces produced.  William Brown’s famous study of 
piecework bargaining (1973) illustrates just how the logic of a common rule could apply even 
in at the workgroup level.  Management acts, of commission or omission, establish 
precedents, and the workplace representatives use these to lever up the pay of all, establishing 
a new common rule. 
  For many decades, such rules also fitted with management’s approach to work 
organisation and performance, often referred to as the ‘bureaucratic’ model of work 
organisation (Jacoby, 1985).  For unions and their members, such rules are simple to enforce 
as it is relatively easy to detect backsliding by management.  For management, having a 
standard set of rates o f pay greatly eases day-to-day work assignments by removing the 
incentive to use each change as a pretext for renewed negotiation over pay.  In a word, one 
might characterise the ‘common rule’ as focusing on the job or the skill as the bearer of 2 
rewards, w ith adjustments being made for workloads and working conditions.  Fairness 
meant giving the same rewards for comparable jobs.  Employee performance was assumed to 
be determined by the job.  This was always a fiction.  Any line-manager or experienced trade 
unionist would tell you there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ workers.  But as bureaucratic work systems 
set rather narrow limits within which individual employees could vary their performance, it 
was a reasonable approximation. 
  Rewarding individual performance rather than the job makes the old-style ‘common 
rule’ inapplicable, and has boosted management’s preference for non-union arrangements.  I 
should like to argue that by maintaining the fairness with which modern incentive systems 
operate, their ‘procedural justice’, unions have a very important role to play.  The early 
Christian missionaries understood that they had to win over the local chief as well as the 
people to establish their churches.  In the same way, unions’ success in representing their 
members depends upon gaining recognition from employers.  In turn, this depends on 




2.  The Advantages for Management 
 
Across the UK public sector, performance management and performance pay have been 
introduced over the past 15 years, mostly being based on line management appraisals of 
individual employee performance.  This follows a similar movement in the private sector 
(Richardson, 1999).  There increasing numbers o f employees are on some kind of 
performance related pay, with line-manager appraisal playing a key role.  At the same time, 
traditional methods of payment-by-results have greatly declined. 
  The heart of the problem for management is to induce their employees to use their 
work discretion to the benefit of the organisation.  This has also been at the core of theories 
of Personnel Economics and of Work Psychology.  In both cases, the dominant theories teach 
that monetary incentives will only achieve this if employees believe their efforts will be 
rewarded, or at least, there is a good chance they will be. 
  The economic theory of incentives, broadly covered by the ‘principal-agent’ problem, 
alerts us to three kinds of problems with performance incentive schemes.  First, it assumes 
that employers and employees are self-interested maximisers.  This leads to the conclusion 3 
that if employee rewards are the same whatever the level of their effort, then they will better 
off if they slack than if they work hard, especially if they can avoid detection.  Performance 
incentives are designed to make employees better off if they work harder, and to punish them 
if they slack. 
  By making pay at least partly contingent on performance, employee rewards become 
variable, which introduces a degree of uncertainty.  This leads to the second observation: that 
employees themselves differ in their preferences about the stability of their income, and differ 
as to what they regard as a reasonable trade-off between pay levels and pay variability.  Some 
may be very risk averse, whereas others enjoy a challenge.  It is quite likely that most 
employees are rather risk averse, and there is some rather fragmentary evidence that public 
sector employees may be more so than those in the private sector as risk averse people seek 
more secure jobs (Mayntz, 1985).  Performance-linked pay systems introduce a third element, 
that is how accurately and honestly management measure performance.  Employees may fear 
that their managers will cheat when assessing employee performance in order to save money 
or engage in favouritism. 
  In a perfect market, such problems may not matter too much.  Workers can choose 
between similar jobs offering different kinds of incentives: one can work as an accountant in 
local government or for a performance-oriented private firm.  Similarly, if a firm gets a bad 
reputation for manipulating its performance schemes, it will find it harder to attract good 
employees, and so will have to pay more.  Either way, fairness issues are dealt with at the 
moment of hiring: people won’t accept job offers they consider unfair.  However, most 
employees continue to be engaged in long-term jobs, and so a rather different set of issues 
arises (Auer and Cazes, 2000). 
  With incumbent employees, market sanctions are greatly diminished by the costs to 
either party of breaking the employment relationship.  Employees have acquired 
organisation-specific skills and knowledge they cannot easily use elsewhere, and from which 
their employers also benefit.  This creates scope for either party to exploit the other by trying 
to appropriate all the gains, and pushing the other almost to the point at which they would 
quit.  Within these limits, then, one side can impose its preferences on the other, and each 
side knows this.  This is sometimes called the ‘hold-up’ problem and it becomes an obstacle 
to free cooperation (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). 
  Management bad faith can take two forms, both of which are relevant for the 
understanding of performance pay systems.  Management may simply not be competent to 
measure performance accurately, and as a result, make employees’ pay more of a lottery than 4 
they would like.  Although management’s intentions may not be devious, they choose to 
ignore employee feelings about the appropriate level of uncertainty in their pay.  Cheap 
performance appraisal systems, in which management invests few resources, but which it 
uses to determine pay, can also be a form of cost-saving for management.  More seriously, 
management may be seen as devious rather than incompetent.  The latter is probably the more 
common of the two, but its consequences are often similar.  Employees are likely to regard 
both kinds of behaviour as ‘unfair’ because they believe management is going back on what 
was agreed, and is trying to get away with it because it knows that quitting is an expensive 
option. 
  Employee perceptions of the risk of bad faith by management greatly complicate the 
operation of incentive schemes that seek to mobilise employee discretion.  If employees don’t 
believe the rewards for extra effort will be forthcoming, they are less likely to respond to the 
incentive scheme.  If they suspect management is being devious, they may resort to the 
minimum prescribed performance standards for their jobs as a sanction against management.  
In practice, as job descriptions are seldom complete or up-to-date, this may mean sticking to 
conventionally accepted performance standards.  Often it is precisely these that management 
is seeking to change.  The general prediction then is that performance pay systems will not 
work unless employees regard them as fair in their design and operation, and corresponding 
to their own preferences for incentives and variability. 
  The psychological theory of expectancy (Lawler 1971) makes  rather similar 
predictions (sketched in Figure 1).  According to this view, employees will respond to 
performance incentives if they value the reward, if they believe their extra effort will generate 
additional performance, and that management will reward  it.  If they believe that 
management cannot measure performance accurately, or that it will renege on promised 
rewards, then again they will not respond to them.  The expectancy framework highlights an 
additional source of potential unfairness, namely that employees may not be in a position to 
improve their performance because of inadequate skills, or poor goal setting and coordination 
by management. 
  The argument has been taken a step further by Cropanzano and Fulger (1974).  They 
argue that ‘procedural justice’ is as important for motivating employees as ‘distributive 
justice’.  The former relates to procedures that operate fairly, and give employees a fair 
chance of gaining a particular reward, in this context, a performance increment.  The latter 
relates to the structure of rewards provided.  These authors show that employees are more 
likely to accept adverse performance ratings if they believe management’s procedures are 5 
fair, and hence they argue that ‘procedural justice’ is a key element in the motivational 
aspects of incentive pay systems. 
  The Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) work on performance pay systems and 
their effects on employee motivation underline the relevance of these considerations 
(Marsden and Richardson 1994, Marsden and French, 1998).  Table 1 summarises employee 
responses to the CEP surveys concerning employee confidence in management’s operation of 
performance pay systems. 
  All of these PRP schemes depended on performance appraisal by line-managers 
except for the group-PRP scheme in one of the trust hospitals, which separated performance 
appraisal from pay.  There was a widespread belief that management could not be trusted.  
Line-managers were often thought to act through favouritism, and senior management was 
believed to operate a quota on good ratings however well people actually performed.  The 
perceived motivation for the quota was exactly that predicted by the principal-agent model, to 
save on pay costs: three quarters of Inland Revenue respondents in the 1996 survey believed 
the purpose of PRP was to save money.  Another sign of employee cynicism was the belief 
that those getting performance pay were cleverer at negotiating their performance 
agreements.  In other words, it was felt that those who had learned how to work the system 
were the ones who got the rewards, and not necessarily those who put in the increased effort 
the schemes were designed to promote. 
  These expressions of employee distrust of management are not peculiar to Britain, 
and so not just a reflection of British ‘them and us’ social attitudes.  Milkovitch and Wigdor 
(1991) report similar suspicions of favouritism and quotas in the US Federal Service 
performance management systems.  And indeed, Koike (1994) provides evidence on how 
Japanese workers seek to control favouritism by line managers in their performance 
management systems. 
  Although our studies have only very limited performance data, it is possible to trace 
the impact of such beliefs on aspects of employee motivation.  Using a more synthetic 
analysis, we ran logit regressions on the same CEP data sets to assess the likelihood that 
employees would be motivated or de-motivated by different aspects of PRP schemes 
(Marsden, French and Kubo, 2000).  These highlight the debilitating effects of perceived 
management bad faith, and when it was felt that management could not evaluate performance 
properly.  When employees did not believe management knew enough to evaluate their 
performance, they were more likely to find the PRP schemes de-motivating.  Conversely, if 
they believed appraisals were conducted properly and fairly, they were more likely to find it 6 
motivating.  Summarising these and other research findings on the main public service 
performance pay schemes, the government’s Makinson report (2000: p.3) concluded that 
current arrangements were ‘ineffective and discredited’ and contrasted ‘approval of the 
principle and disenchantment with the practice of performance pay’. 
  Both theory and this evidence indicate that management has much to gain from 
measures t hat can build employee confidence in the design and operation of their 
performance management systems.  The problem is that it is hard for them to demonstrate the 
credibility of their promises to employees who are already cynical about them.  They are 
caught in the trap of ‘they would say that wouldn’t they’. 
 
 
3.  A Role for Unions? 
 
In the course of the CEP’s research on performance management, discussions with public 
service unions, and the survey results, show that unions have a potentially important part to 
play in improving the procedural justice of these new types of pay and performance 
management systems.  This role can be of benefit both to their members and to management.  
Management can benefit for the reasons just outlined.  Employees can benefit because they 
may gain some protection against unfair treatment by their managers, and perhaps more 
important, it is not pleasant to work in an environment in which colleagues are demoralised 
and relations with management soured. 
  Let us consider three key areas in which unions can intervene: 
•  the operation of PRP schemes and performance management; 
•  the choice of incentives that employee feel are appropriate for their work; 
•  conveying employees’ views on measurement difficulties. 
 
Our surveys provide some useful indicators on all of these counts. 
 
3.1  Operation of performance management 
 
A recurrent theme across the public services covered by our studies has been the need for 
some kind of control over the way management operates performance management systems.  
The fear of favouritism and the belief that management operated a quota on good assessments 7 
are both areas in which independent review of management’s actions would seem relevant.  
In the organisations in which we asked about appeals procedures (civil s ervice 
departments/agencies, hospitals and classroom teachers) there was a clear concern among a 
substantial minority, and a majority in the case of teachers, that appeal procedures needed to 
be more effective. 
  In fact, in the civil service and the hospitals, management went to considerable 
lengths to communicate with staff and their representative organisations.  Our survey results 
were discussed jointly.  More importantly, a certain amount of information about the 
operation of performance management systems is shared.  Management have usually given 
the unions information on the distribution of appraisal scores at a fairly aggregated level.  
Under the March 2000 ‘Partnership Agreement’ between the Cabinet Office and the Civil 
Service unions, union involvement the operation of pay reform was accorded an official 
place, although relations became more strained subsequently. 
 
3.2  The design of performance management systems 
 
A recurrent theme in our survey returns has been that while most public servants in the civil 
service and hospitals (but not schools) approve of the principle of linking pay to performance, 
they are much less happy about the way in which this is done.  While some of this no doubt 
reflects concerns about the operation of performance management systems, some may also 
reflect deeper unease about the type of incentives offered.  Three examples arise from our 
work: whether professional employees respond differently to performance incentives 
compared with those in bureaucratic occupations; how effective pay incentives are for 
organisationally committed employees; and divergent views about the purposes of the 
organisation and consequently about the relevance of different kinds of performance. 
 
Professional versus bureaucratic occupations 
 
Our logit regressions showed that public servants in professional occupations were less happy 
about performance pay than those in what might be called ‘bureaucratic’ ones (Marsden, 
French and Kubo, 2000).  Teachers were far less happy than civil servants.  Within the 
hospitals we have a broader mix of professional and bureaucratic occupations, and there we 
find a clear sign that professionals are less happy than their bureaucratic colleagues.  
Professionals were also more likely to respond that performance pay had no effect on their 8 
performance because they already worked to a professional standard.  Such standards are 
inculcated during the training process, and sustained by peer group activities and professional 
organisations.  Employees in bureaucratic functions are more likely to be used to more direct 
management control of their work so that performance appraisal and performance pay appear 
as less of an intrusion into their professional activities. 
 
Incentive pay and organisational commitment 
 
If one follows the ‘principal-agent’ analysis of performance incentives, it is easy to overlook 
the importance of the initial behavioural assumptions: that employees will opt for low levels 
of effort unless they have financial incentives to put in more effort.  This may not be an 
appropriate assumption for certain categories of workers, particularly those with a strong 
professional or public service orientation.  The CEP PRP surveys all showed quite high levels 
of organisational commitment, using standard measures, compared with studies of other 
employees, and the regression analysis mentioned earlier also found that commitment played 
an important part as a stabiliser of employee motivation.  Although the public servants found 
many aspects of their PRP schemes de-motivating, organisational commitment seemed to 
counteract these to some extent.  If commitment is strong enough to do this, it may also 
counteract the key danger predicted by principal-agent analysis, namely that of moral hazard.  
Committed employees with a strong professional ethic may work to what they consider 
appropriate standards rather than seeking to minimise effort for a given reward, thus 
rendering short-term performance incentives inappropriate, and possibly counter-productive. 
  One other piece of evidence on this score comes from teachers’ explanations of why 
they work long hours during term time (and possibly also into school holidays).  These hours 
are worked on top of a weekly ‘directed time’ of about 33 hours.  Directed hours are those for 
which teachers’ w ork is directed by the school’s management.  ‘Non-directed’ hours are 
discretionary and during which teachers would work to fulfil their professional duties.  The 
dispersion of non-directed hours worked reveals the discretion teachers have, but at the same 
time, the number of such hours they work each week, and the reasons they give for this are 
largely at odds with the assumptions of the principal-agent model.  This appears to be driven 
by their strong concern for their pupils, a high level of commitment to their schools, and 
strong professional values (Table 2). 
  The teachers’ unions have worked hard both to oppose the introduction of a form of 
performance pay for classroom teachers, and to ensure the final version implemented fits the 9 
conditions and aspirations of teachers.  There are some aspects of their scheme, introduced in 
2000, which differ from the forms of PRP applied elsewhere in the public services, and which 
make it almost more akin to acquiring an additional qualification than to appraisal-based pay.  
It would be tempting to see this as a manifestation of the influence of the teachers’ unions, 
but this has to be confirmed by more careful research. 
 
Different views concerning organisational objectives and legitimate incentives 
 
There may also be divergent views on the objectives of public services.  In health services, 
the relative weights attached to aspects of performance that relate to patient care and 
budgetary management are very controversial.  How long should a ward cleaner or a nurse 
chat to a sick patient? No doubt it improves the quality of a stay in hospital, and perhaps 
assists recovery, but it also consumes scarce resources.  In the Employment Service, public 
employees saw their main purpose as helping job seekers find suitable work,  but it was often 
hard to do this within the time limits for interviews set by management to control costs.  
Teachers, it seems, are prepared to contribute large amounts of their own time towards 
supporting their pupils because budgetary pressures leave them little alternative if they are to 
give the quality of education they think right. 
  Top management, which decides on whether to adopt certain types of incentive 
schemes, is often far removed from such information.  Yet inappropriately designed 
incentives often lead to a great deal of needless conflict. 
 
3.3  Practical difficulties of performance measurement and improvement 
 
Whatever the philosophical and moral problems of determining performance objectives, there 
are also much more down-to-earth problems o f measuring performance and determining 
whether people can actually improve their performance even if they want to. 
  There was widespread concern about management’s ability to measure different 
aspects of performance, and to cover what might be called performance in the whole job.  
Our civil service respondents thought there was too much emphasis on quantity, which is 
more easily measured than quality, despite management information campaigns stressing the 
importance of quality.  The former may have been their agenda, but it was not successfully 
communicated to their staff. 10 
  Performance assessment in team working raises particular measurement problems, 
especially when management focus on individual performance.  In schools for example, both 
heads and classroom teachers strongly believed that it was hard to relate pupil performance to 
the work of individual teachers.  Thus a scheme that purports to link pay to the performance 
of individual teachers’ pupils is felt to be measuring the wrong thing. 
  From the civil service and hospital studies, we find that a substantial number of line 
managers who carry out appraisals believe PRP is problematic because staff have insufficient 
control over their jobs to increase their performance.  Around 60% thought this in the civil 
service, and around 40% in the two hospitals.  Our more recent study of classroom teachers 
sheds further light on this issue as we asked teachers whether they thought there were 
significant variations in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in their school, to 
which about 55% replied ‘yes’.  Even more interesting are the reasons teachers gave for these 
individual variations (Table 3).  Of these, only differences in motivation or morale would 
seem to fit well with the principal-agent model, and this is probably an upper limit as some 
morale may be the result of school-wide factors, or of management.  Many of the others 
probably cannot be addressed without management support: more time for training, better 
organisation of workloads by management, and so on. 
  It is often difficult for individual employees to communicate such information to their 
line managers.  There is a fine line between failing to perform because one is incompetent, 
and failing because one lacks necessary resources.  Line managers may also think their staff 
are bargaining for easier targets.  If the problem is poor line management, it becomes even 
harder to transmit the information to higher management.  For these, and other reasons, 
higher management may well be cut off from the information it needs to design and operate 
its incentive schemes effectively: hence the potential role for collective voice. 
 
 
4.  Do Public Employees Believe the Unions are the Bodies to Represent 
Them? 
 
Whether or not unions are the best-placed bodies to take up these issues must depend on the 
confidence of their members.  If they do not believe their unions can help redress unfair 
action by their managers, then there is little unions can do to boost procedural justice and its 
beneficial effects on the operation of performance management. 11 
  Our study of classroom teachers provides some evidence on this issue (Marsden, 
2000).  We asked which groups teachers identified as being on their side in connection with 
performance management (Table 4).  ‘Other teachers’ came out unsurprisingly as the group 
most likely to share the same interests.  However, the teachers’ unions and professional 
associations came out strongly, much more so than the DfEE or LEA and the school’s 
governors. 
  We also asked who might provide a legitimate voice for teachers’ views about the 
goal of performance standards: who should determine standards of excellence in teaching? 
The teaching profession emerged as the leading candidate (Table 5).  As the unions play an 
important part in maintaining the overall coherence of the teaching profession, this suggests 
that they can have a clear role. 
  In view of the union involvement with management in the operation of all of the 
schemes studied, one might object that this demonstrates the counter argument.  The first 
Inland Revenue performance pay scheme was introduced as part of the 1988 pay agreement 
in which it was enshrined.  The Employment Service scheme had the unions negotiating the 
pot of money to be distributed as performance pay.  The two hospitals involved the unions in 
the operation of their schemes, and the schemes for school heads and classroom teachers have 
gone through a lengthy process of public debate.  These are hardly schemes that were just 
dropped on the staff from out of the blue, and on which employee organisations have had no 
voice. 
  Nevertheless, all of these schemes could have enlisted greater involvement from 
unions and professional organisations.  In the 1988 Inland Revenue agreement the then Inland 
Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF) was more or less told if it did not accept PRP there would 
be no agreement.  Similarly, the scheme examined in 1996 kept the unions at arm’s length.  
Given its emphasis on team working, the Employment Service would have been benefited 
from a group  incentive scheme had not Treasury policy insisted on individual schemes.  In 
the two NHS trust hospitals, the schemes were designed and introduced by management, and 
only then did the staff organisations become involved.  The classroom teachers’ new pay 
system has involved rather more consultation, but still less than was legally required judging 
by the successful National Union of Teachers (NUT) action in July 2000 (The Guardian 
Newspaper, 15.7.02)
1. 
                                                 
1 ‘Blunkett humiliated in pay row:  Judge rules that formula to decide teachers’ wages in illegal’, The Guardian 
Newspaper, (15.7.02). 12 
5.  Tensions Within the ‘Procedural Justice’ Role for Unions 
 
In the past, the ‘common rule’ was an effective basis for worker mobilisation in defence of 
common interests.  Dealing with procedural justice issues implicates the unions more closely 
with management because of the nature of the issues to be handled.  One cannot take an 
arm’s length approach while at the same time giving an employee input into the design and 
running of performance management systems.  There is then a risk of ‘incorporation’, that is 
to say, of becoming so involved in joint management of a scheme that one ends up by giving 
too much weight to managerial considerations, and too little to the concerns of ordinary 
employees. 
  This is a real risk, but it is not a new one.  Although the ‘common rule’ has been a 
long-standing trade union method of regulation, it has never been possible to rely solely upon 
it.  Piecework is never as simple in reality as it is in theory because ‘pieces’ are never quite 
the same, and more important, working conditions are variable.  What seemed a fair rate of 
earnings when people could produce a target number of pieces a week becomes inadequate if 
conditions change and it is possible to produce only a fraction of these.  Older piecework 
systems built up complex sets of rules for managing this.  Adjustments would be made if the 
quality of components, or the working environment, deteriorated.  Someone had to decide 
whether the change was sufficiently great for the special adjustment to be applied.  
Management cannot do this alone for the very reasons discussed earlier.  Workplace union 
representatives became heavily involved in such issues, and had to manage the tensions 
involved in this role. 
  The ability of workplace representatives to manage this role depends heavily on the 
amount of back-up provided to them by their unions and professional organisations.  With 
rising levels of general and higher education, management may have less of an educational 
advantage over union representatives than in the past, but they still have greater 
organisational resources at their command.  Whether management should subsidise this 
function, given the benefits it derives from effective procedural justice, is a moot point.  On 
balance, it would probably leave the unions too much in management’s debt, and vulnerable 
to threats to reduce the expenditure.  Management might also feel it wanted to have a say in 
the content of training of local representatives, and that might undermine their independence 
in the eyes of the membership. 13 
  This argument may seem like asking unions to help management.  However, 
promoting procedural justice is also protecting their members against unfair treatment by 
their managers, and perhaps more important, it is not pleasant to work in an environment in 
which colleagues are demoralised and relations with management soured. 14 
Tables 
 
Table 1.  Do public servants trust their management over PRP? 
























Relations with management               
My last appraisal was NOT a fair 
reflection of my performance* 
27  28  31  33  19  33  29 
Management use PRP to reward 
their favourites  
35  57  41  41  27  Na  na 
There is a quota on good 
assessments 
74  78  74  57  na  48  45 
Line manager views:               
PRP has reduced staff 
willingness to cooperate with 
management 
20  45  39  30  27  Na  na 
* reverse scored. 
Note:  Civil service: middle-ranking and junior administrative staff; hospitals: all staff except 
doctors who were outside the scheme; Schools: head teachers – classroom teachers had no 
performance pay scheme at the time. 
Source:  Marsden and French (1998), and Marsden and Richardson (1994). 
 
 
Table 2.  ‘Non-directed’ hours worked by teachers and their reasons 








First reason  Second reason 
Lesson preparation 
and marking 
14.3  15.0  Quality of 
education 
To get the work done 
Seeing parents and 
pupils outside 
class time 
2.3  5.8  Quality of 
education 
Activities occur after hours & 






1.9  na  Activities 
after hours 




3.3  3.1  Management 
pressure 




4.2  2.0  To get the 
work done 





2.0  3.1  Quality of 
education 
Activities occur after hours 
* As a rough check on our results, the distribution of hours between these activities is compared with that found 
by the STRB survey of teachers’ working time in the spring of 1996. The figures relate to secondary schools, 
but they are very similar to those for primary schools. STRB (1996, Table B 2.5). 
Source: Marsden (2000). 
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Table 3.  Reasons teachers gave for differences in teaching effectiveness 
If you believe there is such variation in teaching effectiveness, could you please 
say what you think is the most important cause: 
 
 
a)  different levels of teaching skills 
b)  differences in motivation or morale 
c)  differences in age 
d)  ability to motivate their pupils 
e)  some teachers have a very difficult workload 
f)  several of the above 
g)  other, please specify: 
 
















Source:  Marsden (2000). 
 
 
Table 4.  Which groups do you identify as sharing the same interests as you in 
connection with Performance Management? 
When considering the implementation of PM, which groups do you 








to say  
% 
a)  Your school’s governors  23.3  14.3  62.4 
b)  The leadership group/management team in your school  53.7  17.0  29.4 
c)  Other teachers in your school  79.8  5.2  15.0 
d)  Other teachers in your union or professional association  63.5  4.8  31.6 
e)  Your union or professional association  60.4  7.5  32.0 
f)  The DfEE or your LEA  10.7  35.4  53.9 
Note:  DfEE: Dept for Education and Employment; LEA: Local Education Authority. 
Source: Marsden (2000). 
 
 
Table 5.  Who should determine standards of teaching excellence? 
 
Who do you think should have most say in determining standards of excellence in 





a)  The government and its agencies (eg. DfEE, Ofsted, QCA)  10.5 
b)  Practising teachers as a whole (the teaching profession)  36.5 
c)  Practising teachers in one’s own discipline  23.4 
d)  The management team in individual schools  21.8 
e)  The school’s governors  1.5 
f)  Parents  1.7 
g)  Local and national employers  1.6 
h)  Other (please specify)  1.9 
i)  Several of the above  1.1 
All items  100.0 
Source:  Marsden (2000). 16 
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• Inadequate skills 
• Weak goal setting 
• Poor coordination
Obstacles: 
• Poor performance measurement 
• Mgt. lack necessary money 
• Mgt.bad faith
Obstacles: 
• Performance rewards not valued 
• Other motivators more important 
• Conflicts with other motivators 
• Mgt. motives distrusted
Obstacles: 
• No scope to increase effort 
• Very tight management 
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